



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 31 March 2019

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center re-sources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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Month at a Glance — March


The Indo-Pacific region experienced 137 IED events in March: 88 events in South Asia, 47 events in South East Asia, and two events in Northeast Asia. These events consisted of 227 devices. There were 43 IED detonation events, 25 IED found and cleared events, three IED hoax events, and 66 IED cache events. There were 39 casualties in March: five civilians killed, 28 civilians wounded, zero host nation forces killed, and six host nation forces wounded.

There were 137 IED events in the Indo-Pacific region in March 2019




Icons depict events for March 2019; heat map depicts event density from March 2018 - March 2019


March IED events



March IED events by Country



March IED Casualties



Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.


This document is intended for those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

March Executive Summary

SOUTH ASIA

IED activity increased sharply in March from the previous month (88 events versus 50 events). This increase was primarily due to IED activity in India related to the upcoming general election. Events in India increased by 44%, with the majority of events being IED cache recoveries. Despite this increase in activity, casualties in India dropped in March from the previous month (21 versus 56). Elsewhere in South Asia, IED activity in Nepal quadrupled from the previous month (16 events versus four events) due to the banning of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist led by Netra Bikram Chand. In Sri Lanka, interventions into illegal blast fishing activities led to the recovery of several IED caches. In the coming months, violence in South Asia will likely remain elevated due to the General Elections in India.

South Asia IED Events
March 2018-March 2019




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	19	23	3	106	151
	Year	747	607	29	2052	3435
Event Count	Month	18	19	3	48	88
	Year	384	173	21	301	879

SOUTHEAST ASIA

IED activity more than doubled in March from the previous month (47 events versus 21 events). This increase of events is due to a large coordinated attack in Thailand and increased IED activity in Indonesia. In Thailand, southern insurgents likely conducted a large coordinated attack incorporating pipe bombs and a motorcycle VBIED to commemorate the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty signing and to bring attention to their cause ahead of the 24 MAR elections. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, IED activity in the Philippines dropped slightly in March. Increased extremist activity in Indonesia led to another suicide bombing in March, and an overall increase in IED events. In Burma, despite on-going fighting between the Arakan Army and the Burmese Army, there were no IED events in March.

Southeast Asia IED Events
March 2018-March 2019




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	26	9	0	39	74
	Year	194	172	7	383	756
Event Count	Month	23	6	0	18	47
	Year	168	74	8	138	388

NORTHEAST ASIA


In Northeast Asia, IED activity occurred in both China and Japan. This was the first IED event in Japan since August 2018. The event in Japan targeted a Japanese Government office on a U.S. military base in Okinawa. It is highly probable that the perpetrators of the event detonated the device in protest of plans to move a U.S. facility elsewhere on the island.

Northeast Asia IED Events
March 2018-March 2019




IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.


INDOPACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Past Year IED events by Country



Past Year Casualties by Country




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	66	41	4	46	157
	Year	981	771	38	2413	4203
Event Count	Month	31	12	4	24	71
	Year	577	241	29	400	1247


NOTE: The APCFC Monthly IED report includes both event counts (detonation, found/cleared, hoax, and cache) and device counts. It is important to note that a singular IED event may include multiple devices. For instance, a single IED cache event may contain several devices.

IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: Sibolga, Indonesia Suicide Bombing

On 12 MAR, police arrested a cell of three Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) militants in Sibolga, Indonesia. Police arrested one of those militants, Husain (alias Abu Hamzah), near his home and took him immediately to his residence to facilitate a search of his property. Minutes later, police began to inspect the property grounds when an IED detonated (possibly a CWIED or VOIED), wounding one police officer and one civilian. In an effort to prompt Husain's wife to exit the property and surrender, police negotiated with her for the next 11 hours. At 0120 on 13 MAR, police attempted to forcibly enter the home, which prompted Husain's wife to execute a suicide bombing, killing herself and her two-year-old son. Husain is currently in custody.



Aftermath of the suicide bombing

During the raid on the JAD cell, investigators recovered 300 kilograms of explosives and 15 IEDs, including a PBIED (suicide vest) recovered from the home of one of Husain's accomplices. Police believe that, had they not disrupted the cell, the militants would have used the IEDs to target police stations as part of a broader coordinated attack alongside at least two other JAD cells that police also intercepted.

This event highlights an emerging trend among Indonesian violent extremists; the use of female suicide bombers (Husain's wife is the third Indonesian female suicide bomber). JAD appears to have expanded the traditional role of militant wives from nonlethal support, to assisting in bomb-making and attack execution. The use of women to conduct attacks offers several advantages. First, women are perceived as less threatening and are typically more likely to gain access to potential targets. Second, a suicide attack conducted by a female typically results in increased publicity, which VEOs will exploit for their information operations campaigns. Finally, confining VEO operational planning to a family enhances VEO operational security by creating intelligence collection challenges.

Sources: Straits Times (3/14/19) Reuters (3/12/19)

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Insight into the Longevity of the New People's Army

On 29 MAR, the New People's Army (NPA) celebrated its 50th anniversary throughout the Philippines. Unlike other extremist organizations in the Philippines, the NPA is the only organization that exists across the entirety of the Philippine archipelago and that has demonstrated both an impressive measure of resiliency and a near permanency as a violent extremist organization. Some of the main factors that have contributed to the NPA's longevity over the past five decades includes its ideological consistency, the support provided by the National Democratic Front (NDF) (a social-political advocacy umbrella organization that employs insincere narratives to further Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and NPA objectives), the organization's successful and widespread recruitment tactics, and its steady stream of revenue acquired through the collection of "revolutionary taxes."



Female NPA cadre

The NPA originated in 1969 as the armed militant component of the CPP, designed to employ violent activities in pursuit of CPP objectives. The NPA seeks a complete overthrow of the Philippine government due to its inability to provide basic needs and services to impoverished Filipino people. The NPA has adopted a strategy of protracted guerilla warfare, which includes the deliberate targeting of security forces, government officials, local infrastructure, and businesses. The Communist-Maoist ideological backbone that the group relies on promotes the redistribution of food, goods, services, land, and other resources to citizens that cannot acquire these necessities for themselves or their families. Even though the CPP-NPA-NDF's leader, Jose Maria Sison lives in the Netherlands under voluntary exile, he continues to promote and reinforce the institutionalized communist philosophy of a "people's war."

The NDF is a coalition of revolutionary social and economic justice organizations, agricultural unions, trade unions, indigenous rights groups, leftist political parties, and other related groups in the Philippines. These NDF organizations assist the NPA by providing a pool of people from which to recruit and shape Filipino politics in favor of CPP-NPA-NDF goals. Overtime, the NDF's has expanded its influence to the legitimate political sphere, to include the Philippine Congress. For instance, at least seven congressional members belong to a political party allied with the NDF. One example of how the NDF advocated for those goals is through coordinated efforts in protesting the US-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement in both Congress and the streets. The NPA recruits from these activist groups, particularly when radicalized members feel that nonviolent resistance is insufficient to achieve the organization's objectives. The influence and political strength exhibited by the NDF serves as an enabler of the NPA, both in terms of the political legitimacy and personnel recruitment facilitated by the group.

For fifty years, the NPA contributed to thousands of deaths and immeasurable destruction of property across the entire country. Yet, the group entices a swath of voluntary members to join nearly every day. The NPA conducts recruitment activities from rural areas to university campus grounds, and appear to accept all individuals. In the 1980's the NPA had approximately 25,000 followers but this figure has today dwindled to an estimated 3,900 comrades. The group does not discriminate against gender, age, sexual orientation, or indigenous persons (also known as "lumad"); a philosophy that recruits find highly appealing. Interviews with former rebels insinuate that the appealing factors for many are desires for acceptance and the sharing of a collective purpose. By initiating a self-realized cultural revolution and possessing a common enemy (the government), it has become possible to mobilize the masses from both rural and urban areas.

The NPA derives its funding primarily from "revolutionary taxes" that the group imposes on households and businesses located and operating in NPA territories. The tax ranges from 2-5%, or roughly, what equates to a total income of approximately USD 3.8 million per year. The stark poverty and income disparity in rural areas leaves many locals, but particularly farmers, vulnerable to NPA extortion and consequences for a failure to pay. The NPA has punished those that have failed to pay or those that have rejected the requirement for these payments through the use of IEDs, by burning farm equipment, by breaking windows of business establishments, or via other violent means. In some areas in Mindanao where 1 in 5 people live on less than USD 2 a day, it is not hard to understand why locals entrenched in abject poverty inevitably pay a small fine for additional resources.

The NPA arguably remains the largest internal security threat for the Philippines. The IED activity perpetrated by the NPA highlights the threat posed by this organization. From February 2018 to February 2019 the group was responsible for 90 IED events. The United States Department of State and the European Union designated the NPA a foreign terrorist organization on 9 AUG 2002. Their in-depth knowledge of the jungle and mountainous

Insight into the Longevity of the New People's Army



Former NPA cadre surrendering arms

regions in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao enables members to fight with the same guerrilla style techniques Jose Maria Sison originally implemented following the founding of the group. Recently, community leaders publicly shared their anti-NPA sentiments due to the inherent violence associated to their presence. Even through all the outward aggression, the CPP-NPA-NDF have attempted to find a common ground with the government through on-and-off again localized peace talks that commenced in the 1990s. However, on 23 NOV 2017, Philippine President Duterte signed an official proclamation that terminated all peace talks with the CPP-NPA-NDF. The president continues to waver on his decision to either resume peace talks or to adhere to a firm stance against the prospect of achieving an agreement with the group.

Despite this, President Duterte and the military are actively striving to eradicate the desire and need for Filipinos to support and endorse the NPA. One successful program that the government created and implemented is the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP). This program guarantees that members of terrorist organizations receive a package of benefits that provides medical, dental, education, housing, legal, and livelihood assistance if they surrender to authorities. Within the first two months of 2019, 608 NPA rebels and supporters surrendered to government troops and received immediate protection from any retribution by former cadre members. Despite these efforts, it appears that the central motivations that led to the group's rise in the 1960s are the same reasons they exist today: long-standing feudalism, corrupt bureaucratic-capitalism, and imperialism, which likely explains the continued appeal of the organization. As the government continues to take an aggressive approach to the eradication of the NPA, absent peace talks or addressing the core problems of poverty and corruption, the NPA's revolution will no doubt continue.

Sources: Channel News Asia (1/18/19) Stanford Web (8/24/15) State Department ABS-CBN (3/27/19) Philippine Revolution (3/28/19)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Ali Kalora

ALIAS: Ali Ahmad **ROLE:** Leader of the MIT **AFFILIATION:** The East Indonesia Mujahidin Network (MIT), Islamic militant groups in Mindanao (Philippines) and Bima (West Nusa Tenggara)
AREA OF OPERATIONS: Poso, Central Sulawesi



Ali Kalora is the leader of the MIT operating out of Poso, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. Kalora replaced the former leader, Santoso, after Indonesian security forces killed him in July 2016. Kalora was Santoso's second in command and the natural successor to lead the MIT. Currently, he leads a small group of approximately 15 individuals. Kalora has communications with ISIS affiliates in the Philippines and Bima, which possibly enabled him to recruit the last four to seven members. Kalora does not yet appear to be as talented a recruiter as Santoso; however, if his communications with Southeast Asian ISIS affiliates continue, his recruitment numbers may increase (assuming he evades capture by the Tinombala Task Force (TTF)).

Raids on MIT camps indicate that Kalora and his group have the capability to construct IEDs. In a cache found on 5 MAR, the TTF found four IEDs. The cache contained two partially built devices and two completed devices. Historically, the MIT has conducted IED attacks, but reporting does not yet indicate that Kalora's current group has successfully detonated any devices. However, Kalora's MIT was responsible for the mutilation of a man in late December 2018, and the group has exchanged gunfire with authorities on multiple occasions.

Despite the existence of more deadly and active Indonesian VEOs, such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), Indonesian security forces perceive MIT as a persistent threat to Central Sulawesi. MIT's recent recruiting successes and communications with ISIS-aligned VEOs in Southeast Asia seem to justify security forces' continued concerns that the group could repopulate and attempt to destabilize the area with IEDs or other attacks.

Sources: BBC Indonesia (1/2/19) Detiknews (5/5/19) CNN Indonesia (2/14/19) Berita SATU (2/25/19) Media Indonesia (2/8/19)


VEO: New People's Army

FOUNDED: 29 MAR 1969 **LEADERS:** Benito Tiamzon (Chairman of the CPP-NPA) and Wilma Tiamzon (Secretary General of the CPP-NPA) **AREAS OF OPERATION:** Philippines (concentrated in Davao, Caraga, and Bicol regions, but exist in rural pockets nationwide) **STRENGTH:** 3,900 militants (Philippine military's 2018 Estimate) **AFFILIATION:** Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), National Democratic Front (NDF) **TTPs:** CWIEDs, complex attacks (IEDs and small arms), arson, revolutionary taxes (extortion)

The NPA is the military wing to the CPP and NDF. Their collective goal is to establish a communist state in the Philippines. The threat they pose has fluctuated over the course of their campaign, peaking in the 1980s during the controversial regime of President Marcos, at 25,000 militants in the NPA and 500,000 activists in the NDF.

According to Philippine military figures, the NPA was the deadliest VEO from the period of 2014 – 2018, killing 444 soldiers (this includes non-IED related casualties). Over the past year the NPA was responsible for a total of 89 out of 162 IED events in the Philippines (approximately 55% of IED events), and are the only VEO to operate nationwide.

Past Year IED Events perpetrated by NPA



Sources: BBC (2/15/19) Australian National Security (3/4/219) Euronews (2/24/19) GlobalSecurity (2/25/19) Al Jazeera (2/27/19)

South Asia: March Significant Activity

Bangladesh

On 14 MAR, Dhaka Metropolitan Police's Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime unit (CTTC) submitted charges against six suspects in the February 2015 murder of US Citizen Avijit Roy. Roy, a liberal writer critical of Islamic extremism, was visiting Dhaka with his wife for a book fair when several militants hacked him to death and severely wounded his wife. Authorities charged Ansar al-Islam (Ansarullah Bangla Team, ABT) militants with planning and executing the murder as a part of ABT's coordinated effort to kill individuals listed on the group's 2012 hitlist. While police have detained some of the militants, the most senior of those charged is the operational commander of ABT, former Army Major Zia ul-Haq, who has been absconding since 2011. The trial of those charged started on 25 MAR. **BD News 24 (3/14/19) Dhaka Tribune (3/14/19)**

On 18 MAR, assailants opened fire on election officials and security forces returning from a polling station with ballot boxes in Baghaicchari, Rangamati, killing seven and wounding 11. Police officials suspect an armed ethnic group operating in the Chattogram Hill Tracks conducted the well-planned ambush, during which they shot election personnel at point-blank range. The polls are a part of the government mandated re-polling occurring in some districts that experienced a potentially high level of election irregularities in the 30 DEC elections. Violence related to re-polling has occurred in several places throughout the country and has included the wounding of 80 civilians and the destruction of private property in Barisal. This violence also resulted in the wounding of 12 civilians during a fight between different factions of the Awami League in Khulna, and the shooting death of an Awami League leader in Rangamati. **Daily Star (3/10/19) UNB (3/19 19) TOI (3/19/19) BD News 24 (3/21/19)**

India

On 10 MAR, the Indian Army reportedly killed Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) commander, Mudasir Ahmad Khan and another JeM militant from Pakistan, named Khalid. Khan was the main conspirator in planning the 14 FEB Pulwama CRPF convoy attack, according to LT GEN K.J.S. Dhillon, Commanding officer of the Army's 15 Corps. The terrorists were taking refuge in a village residence when military forces found them. The security forces blew up the house in which the militants were hiding, killing them both immediately. Khan, also known as Mohammad Bhai, was a 23-year-old electrician who reportedly joined JeM in January 2018 and participated in several terror attacks against Indian targets. Reporting indicates that Indian security forces tracked down and killed 14 of the 18 JeM militants who participated in the Pulwama attack. This action was a major success for India. Of the 18 militants, 10 were locals, and eight were from Pakistan. **The Hindu (3/11/19)**

The Indian Army has reportedly been moving troops closer to the Line of Control (LoC) on the India/Pakistan border since the 14 FEB Pulwama attack on Indian Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) cadres. Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) claimed responsibility for this attack, which left 40 dead. Observers have noted major shifts in the movement of Indian armor units, amid reports that Pakistan is moving residents out of sensitive border villages and responding with a similar troop build-up along the LoC. India is further stressing that Pakistan needs to take credible, substantial control over anti-Indian, Pakistani-based insurgent groups conducting cross-border operations against Indian targets inside of India. Indian Air Force jets bombed a JeM training camp about 30 miles west of the LoC in response to the Pulwama attack. This bombing is significant because it is the first time Indian forces crossed into Pakistani territory proper, rather than bombing territory claimed by both India and Pakistan, since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. **News Track (3/30/19)**

Reporting from 25 MAR indicates India's Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) paramilitary units plan to enhance levels of troop protection by improving armor on its fleet of vehicles. Recent attacks, especially the 14 FEB Pulwama attack, convinced security forces' leadership that upgrading their transportation is long overdue. Another step toward protecting forces against IED attacks will be to increase the number and quality of its bomb detection units for its 65 battalions operating in the Kashmir Valley. A final step in assuring the safety of troops during movements will be to better engineer how and when convoys move in operationally sensitive areas and to allow personnel to fly commercially when possible to avoid the vulnerabilities of travel on dangerous roads. **The Economic Times (03/25/19)**

Throughout March, Indian authorities recovered several large caches of explosive materials, including approximately seven tons of ammonium nitrate in West Bengal. It is likely that increased trafficking in explosives, coupled with greater vigilance by security forces ahead of the upcoming general election season, contributed to a substantial increased recovery of IED caches over the past month. Security forces have been establishing checkpoints across Maoist strongholds in an effort to curb the movement of explosive material used in making IEDs; the Red Corridor is a production hub for licit explosive materials that are often used for both legitimate and

South Asia: March Significant Activity

illegitimate mining activities. Indian authorities suspect that the individuals or groups responsible for the items discovered in the March caches may have been planning to use the contents to manufacture crude bombs to disrupt the upcoming general elections. **Last LY (3/15/19) Times of India (3/16/19)**

Nepal

In February and March, a series of high-profile activities highlighted the increasingly concerning aggression of Netra Bikram Chand's Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M). Following the 22 FEB IED attack on cell phone provider Ncell, the Government of Nepal decided to ban the group for their "crime-oriented approach." CPN-M has perpetrated a considerable portion of the political violence over the last three years, to include the use of IEDs, small arms, and arson attacks that have wounded and killed civilians, government officials, and security forces. In protest of the government ban, CPN-M activists instituted a nationwide transportation blockade on 14 MAR, during which they detonated IEDs in various areas of the country, conducted arson attacks on civilian buses, and engaged in other lawless behavior. Throughout March, police detained more than 20 CPN-M activists. **Setopati (3/12/19) Dev Discourse (3/12/19) Indian Express (3/14/19) Setopati (3/15/19) My Republica (3/21/19)**

On 3 MAR, the Department of Money Laundering Investigations announced an investigation into CPN-M spokesperson Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma. Officials announced the investigation after police revealed documents indicating Bishwakarma was engaging in extortion activities to raise funds for CPN-M terror operations. Bishwakarma is a founding member of the current CPN-M under Netra Bikram Chand. **Kathmandu Post (3/3/19)**

On 5 MAR, media reported the arrest of a CPN-M leader, Dev Kumar Limbu, who was reportedly in possession of an M-16 rifle and a light machine gun. Discovery of the weapons led to an investigation into the number of weapons in possession of CPN-M cadre. The group may have amassed thousands of pieces of military equipment located in various places throughout the country. During the civil war period, the group looted and stole much of its equipment and weapons from military and police bases. **Kathmandu Post (3/5/19)**

Maldives


In March, the chair of a presidential commission, Husnu Suood, confirmed for the first time that the high-profile murders of a lawmaker and a liberal blogger and the disappearance of a journalist and the attempted murder of another liberal blogger were the work of a religious extremist organization and radicalized gangs. Families of the victims have demanded government action and transparency since the attacks started in 2012. The victims all had an online presence and spoke openly about social issues, human rights, and religion, which likely contributed to their targeting by militant organizations. While Suood declined to name the extremist organization involved, his confirmation was the first step towards fulfilment of the new president's campaign promise regarding truth and transparency in the investigation of these four cases. His confirmation was also the first time that the government openly identified the connection between extremist elements and radicalized gangs.

Maldives Independent (3/21/19)

Sri Lanka

On 1 MAR, police arrested a second man connected to the recovery of a bag containing four hand grenades, a pistol, ammunition, and other items. The detained suspect is a former member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Police previously arrested a suspect in connection to the bag and recovered cell phones from him that they used to track down the second suspect. **Tamil Guardian (3/3/19)**

Bangladesh: March IED Events



There was one IED detonation event and three IED cache events.

On 4 MAR, Dhaka Metropolitan Police Detective Branch recovered an IED cache following the arrest of a Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) member and 13 members of a criminal gang in Jatrabari and Rampura, Dhaka. The group reportedly robbed several locations over the last year to raise funds to support militant operations. The cache contained 10kg of gunpowder, one AK-22 rifle, two pistols, cash (approximately USD 4,174), and sharp weapons. **Daily Star (3/5/19)**


On 28 MAR, police recovered an IED cache in Batiaghata, Khulna following a gunfight between drug dealers. During the gunfight, one drug dealer died. The cache contained explosive materials, one firearm, and three rounds of ammunition. **Daily Star (3/29/19)**

On 31 MAR, political activists detonated crude bombs in an attempt to take over a polling center in Sadipur, Sonargaon, Narayanganj, Dhaka; no casualties reported. Police detained two suspects and recovered an IED cache that contained explosives. **Dhaka Tribune (3/31/19) Daily Star (3/31/19)**


IED activity dropped in March from the previous month. Despite this drop, one of the events was particularly concerning. The 4 MAR cache recovery revealed that HuJI-B may be reorganizing itself and could attempt to free Mohammad Ujjal, a HuJI-B member on death row convicted for the 2004 grenade attack in Dhaka that killed 24 civilians and wounded 300. Investigation into the suspects detained on 4 MAR also revealed the extent to which militant organizations are engaging in criminal activity to raise funds. This militant/criminal group conducted at least nine robberies in different places and raised approximately USD 600,000. HuJI-B had reportedly given the criminals arms in return for 30% of the stolen funds. Previously, investigations into similar activity indicated that militants used those funds to purchase weapons, fund operations, pay for legal fees, and to give stipends to jailed members' families. IED activity in the coming month will likely remain stable, though increases related to re-polling could occur.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	2	0	0	0	2
	Year	224	30	2	297	553
Event Count	Month	1	0	0	3	4
	Year	72	9	2	65	148


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

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India: March IED Events



There were 13 IED detonation events, 12 IED found and cleared events, one hoax event, and 38 IED cache events.

On 19 MAR, Maoists detonated an IED during an ambush on a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) patrol, followed by an exchange of small arms fire, near two CRPF posts in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh. The attack killed one CRPF member and injured six others. Reporting did not indicate how many of the casualties the IED detonation caused. **Times of India (3/19/19)**

On 30 MAR, an SVBIED partially detonated when a militant targeted a CRPF convoy on the Jammu-Srinagar Highway in Jammu and Kashmir. The militant intentionally hit the rear of a CRPF bus in the convoy and attempted to detonate the SVBIED. Reporting indicates that the SVBIED only partially detonated, possibly due to a faulty trigger mechanism. The partial explosion injured the attacker and damaged the bus. Inside the vehicle, authorities reportedly found two gasoline-filled propane tank IEDs, weighing 15 and 5 kilograms, respectively. Police also found a 9-volt battery, a can filled with suspected nitric acid, ammonium nitrate, 50 gelatin sticks, urea, and sulphur. The injured militant fled the scene of the detonation, but authorities later apprehended him. **India Today (3/30/19) Business Standard (4/1/19)**


On 30 MAR, security forces recovered an IED cache following a raid on a suspected Maoist camp in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh. The cache included three arrows tipped with improvised grenades, one tiffin bomb, one locally-made hand grenade, three gelatin sticks, and an electronic detonator. **Business Standard (3/30/19)**

IED activity in March increased significantly from the previous month, likely because of the upcoming Lok Sabha (general) elections scheduled for 11 APR to 19 MAY. Maoist insurgents continued to increase their activity during the election season in the east-central hill region of India, seeking either greater autonomy or complete independence for their ethnic or tribal groups. These insurgents will likely make greater attempts to create disturbances ahead of polling, as Maoists have issued threats to villagers to boycott polls. The 30 MAR cache recovery was significant because it was the first reporting on improvised grenade/IED-tipped arrows since April 2018. This TTP essentially employs the arrows to funnel security forces into a more deadly IED ambush, and Maoists last used it effectively against security forces in March 2017.


Attacks on security forces, particularly in remote regions, have also increased. Both of the 19 and 30 MAR IED attacks highlight the complexity of the threat faced by CRPF personnel. Continued Maoist activity, such as ambushes against security forces, indicates that the Maoist threat remains persistent, despite a reduction in overall activity over the last year. Conversely, militant activity in Jammu and Kashmir continues to increase, and the threat from both local insurgents and Pakistan-backed militants has led to an increasingly hostile security environment. Investigations into the attempted 30 MAR SVBIED attack indicate that the driver is likely a Hizbul Mujahideen recruit who intended to conduct a catastrophic attack similar to the 14 FEB Pulwama SVBIED attack. This suggests that insurgent/militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir could attempt to conduct further copycat attacks or other spectacular attacks, capitalizing on the momentum from the 14 FEB attack.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	13	16	1	79	109
	Year	458	515	8	1719	2700
Event Count	Month	13	12	1	38	64
	Year	271	110	8	214	603


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: March IED Events



There were three IED detonation events, seven IED found and cleared events, two IED hoax events, and four IED cache events.

On 8 MAR, CPN-M militants detonated an IED outside the residence of Rohan Gurung, the Chairman of the Nepal Association of Foreign Employment Agencies, in Basundhara, Kathmandu, Bagmati, injuring four civilians. In response to the attack, 1,100 labor agencies demanded increased security. **My Republica (3/8/19) My Republica (3/10/19) Online Khabar (3/10/19) Kathmandu Post (3/10/19)**


On 13 MAR, suspected CPN-M militants detonated a gas cylinder IED outside a local government office in Bharatpur-5, Chitwan, Province 3. Police detained nine suspects following the detonation, three of which are confirmed members of CPN-M. **My Republica (3/13/19) Kathmandu Post (3/14/19)**

On 23 MAR, a joint police team recovered an IED cache following the arrest of nine CPN-M suspects in Milche, Khanikhola, Kavrepalanchok, Province 3. One of the suspects, Hemanta Prakash Oli, a regional commander of CPN-M, confessed to involvement in the 22 FEB Ncell IED attack in Kathmandu. The cache contained five gelatin sticks, five detonators, two Japanese made pistols loaded with six rounds each, fifteen additional rounds of ammunition, laptops, and several cell phones. **Himalayan Times (3/24/19) Himalayan Times (3/25/19)**


IED activity increased substantially in March as compared to the previous month. The increase was due to ongoing political violence conducted by Netra Bikram Chand's CPN-M. In particular, the group stepped up its activity after 12 MAR, following the imposition of a ban on the group by the Government of Nepal. The government instituted the ban due to the Ncell attack on 22 FEB, which killed one civilian and injured two, and the 8 MAR attack on Rohan Gurung's residence. While a great deal of legal uncertainty exists about the legitimacy of the ban, it is important to realize that CPN-M has conducted most of the political violence over the past three years. By banning the group, the government has taken a commendable stance against this type of divisive, violent activity. CPN-M's response to the ban was predictable: it called for a nationwide strike and then put innocent civilian lives at risk with IED attacks and other violent acts. Nepal Army EOD and police forces successfully prevented most of the violence through a series of clearing operations and arrests. IED activity could increase in the coming months if the government upholds the ban.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	3	7	2	2	14
	Year	64	62	19	6	151
Event Count	Month	3	7	2	4	16
	Year	40	54	11	10	115


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

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Sri Lanka: March IED Events



There was one IED detonation event and three IED cache events.

On 11 MAR, Sri Lankan Navy personnel recovered an abandoned IED cache on the beach in Sagarapura, Trincomalee, Northern Province. The cache contained two water gel sticks, eight non-electric detonators, and five safety fuses. **Daily News (3/15/19)**


On 14 MAR, police recovered an IED cache from a suspect's hideout in Badulla, Badulla, Uva. The cache contained 25 Hakkapatas explosives (locally made), 10kg of game meat, 12 cannabis plants, and a live pangolin (an endangered species). Based upon the items discovered at the site, the suspect is likely a smuggler and a poacher. **News First (3/14/19)**

On 14 MAR, Navy personnel recovered an IED cache that suspects had thrown into the ocean in Chemmalei, Mullaitivu, Northern Province. The cache contained one gelignite stick, six non-electric detonators, and seven safety fuses. **Daily News (3/15/19)**


IED activity in March increased from the previous month due to the Sri Lankan Navy conducting operations to disrupt blast fishing. These operations revealed that criminal elements may be transporting commercial grade explosives (such as gel sticks and detonators) that blast fisherman then acquire and use. Further disruption operations could yield more explosives caches in the coming months.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	0	0	25	26
	Year	1	0	0	30	31
Event Count	Month	1	0	0	3	4
	Year	1	0	0	64	12

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: March Significant Activity

Philippines

Although not confirmed, media reported that Abu Dar (aliases Owayda Benito Marohomsa and Humam Abdul Najib) died on 15 MAR after a small arms attack erupted between military forces and the Maute Group. Soldiers from the 103rd Infantry Brigade clashed with Maute Group militants in Tubaran Town, resulting in the deaths of four army soldiers and two Mautes. Abu Dar is one of the last remaining high-profile leaders from the Maute Group and authorities believe he succeeded Abdullah and Omar Maute after their deaths during the 2017 Marawi Siege. He managed to maintain a low profile during the months following Marawi, but with the help of local tips, authorities located him in the southern mountains in Lanao del Sur Province. One individual is typically not the linchpin of a decentralized terrorist organization, but due the increased intensity of military operations in the southern Philippines, it is likely that the Maute Group will continue to deteriorate. **Straits Times (3/16/19)**
MindaNews (3/16/19)

On 20 MAR, the United Nations provided an update for the Mindanao Humanitarian Situation that revealed approximately 56,000 displaced persons still require food, water, shelter materials, sanitation needs, and school supplies as an emergency response across the island. The most affected provinces include Marawi, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, and Sulu, all of which are overwhelmingly plagued with violent extremist groups that continue to inflict terror in and around local villages. Moreover, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) operations against violent extremists have prompted civilian displacements. For example, the AFP conducted a raid between 11-14 MAR in Lanao del Sur against Maute Group members, which caused the displacement of an estimated 8,911 individuals. Thousands of residents, displaced after Marawi in 2017, are still living in evacuation centers, transitory sites, and home-based locations. Although multiple humanitarian organizations and non-government organizations are providing assistance for basic needs, authorities have not yet implemented firm solutions to reduce the impact on civilians. **Relief Web (3/20/19)** **ABS (3/23/19)**

Thailand

On 24 MAR, Thailand held its first general elections since the 2014 coup that installed current Prime Minister, Prayut Chan-o-cha. While the elections remained relatively peaceful, authorities have not yet released the results and the outcome remains unclear, as neither the pro-military nor the pro-Democracy factions were able to secure a decisive victory. Observers have noted some irregularities that might call into question the results; specifically, the close voting margins. While the pro-military Palang Pracharath Party secured the most votes with 8.4 million, the Thaksin-aligned pro-Democracy Pheu Thai and Future Forward parties received a combined 13.9 million votes. These two parties will likely form a coalition government with other, smaller parties that may allow them to win control of government. Given the uncertain outcomes and irregularities, the election has the potential to prompt unrest throughout the country. **Khasod (3/27/19)** **CNN (3/27/19)** **The Diplomat (3/29/19)**

Burma

On 5 MAR the Arakan Army (AA), released a statement claiming the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) troop buildup in Rakhine had reached over 8,000 personnel. According to the statement, reinforcements included personnel from the 22nd, 55th, 66th, and 99th Myanmar Light Infantry Divisions. The troop buildup follows the Burmese government's directive to "crush" the AA, following a series of attacks against police outposts in early January. The press notes that there were clashes between AA and the Tatmadaw in Mrauk-U and Paletwa from 3-5 MAR. As the Tatmadaw buildup continues and fighting intensifies, the likelihood of AA resorting to IED activity increases, particularly as the group has employed IED in the past. **Radio Free Asia (3/6/19)**

On 15 MAR, the Burmese government's National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC) invited eight armed ethnic groups (AEGs), which have not signed a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA), to attend collective peace discussions for the first time. The conference will occur in April, and discussions would likely include the temporary unilateral ceasefire that the Tatmadaw declared in December 2018. This conference would be one of a series of periodic peace conferences that encourage AEGs to join the NCA. Ten other ethnic groups have already signed the NCA. **Radio Free Asia (3/15/19)**

On 16 MAR, media reported on the completion of a 17 FEB-2 MAR joint operation between the Tatmadaw and the Indian Army along the Indo-Burmese border, which intended to neutralize threats to both countries. Two groups, the AA and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K), operate camps across the border from the countries that they respectively target. Officials claim the Indian Army destroyed an estimated eight to ten AA camps in India, while the Tatmadaw has detained over a dozen NSCN-K leaders in Burma. **India Today (3/15/19)** **Indian Express (3/16/19)**

Southeast Asia: March Significant Activity

On 29 MAR, Tatmadaw personnel fired small arms at a village in Rakhine, killing at least two civilians. While the Tatmadaw released an official account of the event, eyewitnesses have disputed their report and independent media sources have not been able to confirm it. According to the Tatmadaw, AA militants had attacked a column of Tatmadaw and police personnel at a nearby bridge with small arms, heavy arms, and mines. The AA militants then reportedly retreated to Authar Kan in Mrauk-U and allegedly engaged the security forces with more direct fire and detonated two “remote-controlled mines.” The Tatmadaw claims the two civilians supposedly died in the crossfire. Local villagers and members of the AA provided different versions of the events. They claimed there had been no encounter at the bridge and that the Burmese military had fired into the village without apparent provocation; however, other details such as casualties and detainees, match both sides’ accounts. **Irrawaddy (3/29/19) Radio Free Asia (3/29/19) Global New Light of Myanmar (3/30/19)**


Indonesia

On 7 MAR, a firefight in the remote region of Papua killed three to five Indonesian soldiers and five to ten West Papua National Liberation Army fighters. The firefight, which lasted for several hours in Mugi, Nduga, consisted of 50 to 70 rebels. The rebels attacked a group of 25 soldiers with firearms, spears, and arrows. The Indonesian military recently deployed 600 soldiers, including 150 combat engineers, to the area to provide security for and to complete construction of the 4,600 km Trans-Papua highway. At least 31 people have died since early November in an apparent escalation of attacks by the West Papua National Liberation Army. **Nation (3/21/19) Guardian (3/8/19)**

Malaysia

On 5 MAR, Malaysian police deported seven foreign terror suspects, consisting of six Egyptians and one Tunisian. Police alleged that a 21-year-old Egyptian and a 22-year-old Tunisian were members of Ansar Al Shariah in Tunisia (an al-Qa’ida-affiliated VEO). The two suspects entered Malaysia using counterfeit Syrian travel documents. Police allege that the other five Egyptians were members of the Muslim Brotherhood (which Egypt labels as a terror organization). The militants planned to marry local women to get spousal visas to enable them to live in Malaysia or to remain in the country through educational or business ties. Police believe these seven men intended to use Malaysia as a “safe haven” for transit and logistics. **Straits Times (3/11/19) Channel News Asia (3/10/19) Daily Express (3/22/19)**

Philippines: March IED Events



There were two IED detonation events, two IED found and cleared events, and 14 IED cache events.

On 3 MAR, eight New People's Army (NPA) members surrendered to authorities and turned in one IED in Talacogon, Agusan del Sur, Caraga, Mindanao. The NPA militants also turned in two M16 rifles, two US Garand rifles, one US carbine rifle, one improvised M79 grenade launcher, three .45 caliber pistols, and one hand grenade. The members attribute their decision to surrender to witnessing the successful integration of former members into society through the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) and fatigue from government clearing operations. **EASTMINCOM (3/5/19)**


On 10 MAR, an unidentified person detonated an IED at the Masbate seaport in Poblacion, Balud, Masbate, Bicol, Masbate. The detonation destroyed a government-owned speedboat. Two similar IED explosions occurred near the Masbate port in August and September 2018, resulting in destroyed government property and speedboats. The previous events are most likely unrelated, but highlight the persistent threat posed to government property in Masbate. **MB (3/11/19)**

On 21 MAR, military forces recovered three IEDs during a raid in Penditin, Shariff Saydona Mustapha, Maguindanao, Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), Mindanao. Authorities uncovered an abandoned safe house belonging to the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and discovered the IEDs within the ceiling of the house. This was one of several military operations aimed at eliminating the BIFF militants in Maguindanao Province. **Panay News (3/18/19)**


IED activity in March was slightly higher than February, with the majority of events being caches perpetrated by the NPA. Police and military forces dedicated resources in three separate provinces to simultaneously attempt to eradicate militants aligned to Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), BIFF and the NPA. These operations occurred simultaneously across Maguindanao, Sulu, and around Davao, and resulted in the vast majority of the recorded cache events. The NPA perpetrated numerous small arms fire attacks across several regions in the southern Philippines against authorities leading up to, and in celebration of, their 50th anniversary, but did not execute any large-scale IED-related events as anticipated.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	2	3	0	24	29
	Year	71	89	3	170	333
Event Count	Month	2	2	0	14	18
	Year	67	46	3	108	222


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

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Thailand: March IED Events



There were 19 IED detonation events, three IED found and cleared events, and one IED cache event.

Between 9 and 10 MAR, insurgents detonated 16 pipe bombs, carried out a motorcycle-VBIED attack, and perpetrated an unknown IED event in Satun and Phattalung. Authorities also found and cleared two pipe bombs. Investigators suspect the Southern Thai Insurgency (STI) was responsible for these attacks. **The Nation (3/10/19)**

On 12 MAR, insurgents conducted a complex attack against a border patrol outpost along the Kolok River in Tak Bai, Narathiwat, wounding two soldiers and one civilian. A squad of insurgents commenced the attack by opening fire on the outpost to provide cover for a second group that emplaced a 25kg IED. This IED detonation destroyed the outpost and caused the casualties. Insurgents then threw pipe bombs to prevent the border patrol personnel from chasing as they fled. **The Nation (3/15/19) Bangkok Post (3/14/19)**


On 13 MAR, two militants dressed in Muslim women's clothes threw IEDs at a police station in Subotasae, Yi-ngo, Narathiwat. The devices reportedly weighed 1kg and emitted smoke shortly before they detonated. **Bangkok Post (3/13/19)**

IED activity in Thailand increased substantially in March compared to previous months, though the level of activity is likely to return to historical norms in the near term. The 24 MAR general elections transpired absent violence despite setbacks to Thaksin-aligned parties, which have been associated with violent protests in the past. However, the electoral outcome remains uncertain and irregularities in the process could still lead to unrest (see **SEA SIGACTs**).


The STI likely conducted the 9-10 MAR attacks to draw attention to the 1909 Anglo-Siamese treaty (signed on 10 MAR 1909), which southern Thai insurgents view as part of their claim to legitimacy. They also likely wanted to bring attention to the insurgency just before the 24 MAR general election. One of the groups in the STI, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), recently appointed a new leader (see **February 2019 Monthly**), who may have been motivated to conduct the 9-10 MAR IED attacks. Sama-ae Kho Zari took power in December 2018, and has directed an escalation of violence in an effort to establish himself as a leader, to improve morale, and to gain the confidence of his organization. Though the 9-10 MAR coordinated attacks did not reach the scale of similar attacks prior to the Thai peace process, this was the first time insurgents have targeted Satun and Phattalung.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	22	3	0	0	25
	Year	91	49	0	41	181
Event Count	Month	19	3	0	1	23
	Year	79	20	0	7	106


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Indonesia: March IED Events



There were two IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, and three IED cache events.

On 9 MAR, police recovered an IED cache in conjunction with the arrest of a Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) militant in Kedaton, Lampung. The cache contained potassium chlorate-based explosives and an on-off switch. The JAD militant's parents notified police of their 23-year-old son's odd behavior. The cache was found in a neighbor's attic, unbeknownst to the neighbor. **Coconuts (3/11/19) Asia News (3/13/19)**


From 12-13 MAR, two IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, and one IED cache event occurred near a JAD militant's home in Sibolga, North Sumatra (**see Incident Highlight**). **Straits Times (3/14/19) Reuters (3/12/19)**

On 21 MAR, police recovered an IED cache following a firefight with Mujihidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) militants in Parigi Moutong, Central Sulawesi. Police killed three MIT militants in the encounter. The cache contained several IEDs, 55 bullets, and a saw. **Benar News (3/25/19)**


Indonesia experienced a significant increase in IED activity in March due to the events related to the 13 MAR Sibolga suicide bombing. Following the incident, police arrested six suspects (four men and two women) believed to be connected to the Sibolga JAD cell. In recent years, the province of North Sumatra has seen several other, JAD-connected plots. The most recent event occurred in October 2018, when Indonesian police recovered three suicide vests from a JAD cell after gunning down two of their militants in Tanjung Balai. The cell had been plotting to attack Buddhist temples and police stations in the area. JAD remains the most active and deadly VEO in Indonesia.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	2	3	0	15	20
	Year	14	11	3	167	175
Event Count	Month	2	1	0	3	6
	Year	9	4	3	13	29


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Northeast Asia: March Significant Activity

China

In March 2019, satellite images revealed new internment camp construction in Tibet. Like the camps in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) that the Chinese government has referred to innocuously as “reeducation centers,” Chinese officials refer to these new Tibetan camps as Buddhist temples. According to analysts, three new camps with high walls and watch towers appear to be more than worship centers. This March is the 60th anniversary of the Tibetan national uprising against Chinese occupation. The Chinese government has opted to close Tibet to outside tourism during this time. **Epoch Times (3/12/19)**

On 13 MAR, China blocked another attempt by India and its allies to add the Jaish-e-Mohammad leader, Azhar Masood, to the UN list of global terrorists. China claimed it needed more time to evaluate the request, as it had in 2009, 2016, and 2017. This action put a technical hold on the nomination process and again effectively protected Masood on the global stage. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China may bar the listing of Masood as a global terrorist in the future. A listing would restrict Masood’s ability to operate and fund operations. Pakistan would also have difficulty allowing Masood to live and move freely in the country. China is likely resisting the designation in support of its Pakistani ally. **MENAFN (3/17/19)**

On 21 MAR, the Tianjiayi Chemical Factory in Jiangsu, China, was the site of a catastrophic explosion, resulting in 78 deaths and over 600 wounded. Authorities cited the pesticide factory for safety violations in the past. According to China’s Earthquake Administration, the blast was powerful enough to register as a 2.2 magnitude earthquake. Chinese authorities have scrambled to prevent further environmental damage stemming from the release of chemicals. Such chemicals have contaminated three rivers flowing through the area. For instance, nitrogen levels in one of the rivers reached 200 percent above safety standards. Air tests in the area also showed nitrogen at twice the permissible level for safe breathing. Officials detained three workers in relation to the blast. **Fortune (3/22/19) South China Morning Post (4/3/19)**

On 22 MAR, a man carried an unspecified amount of explosives onto a public bus in Hunan province with the intention of threatening a business partner. Along the route to Guanxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, the explosives detonated accidentally. The explosion engulfed the bus in flames, killed 26 including the perpetrator, and injured 28. **Shine (3/30/19)**

Japan

On 24 MAR, perpetrators gained access to Camp Foster, Okinawa, and ignited two canisters of fuel (likely butane cooking cans) outside a building that houses Japanese government offices. There are no suspects or leads; the base commander has made an appeal to the public for any information regarding the perpetrators. Protests occur periodically in Okinawa over the presence of U.S. bases. Just days before this event, the Japanese government announced that runway expansion at Camp Schwab on Okinawa would commence as part of future plans to move U.S. Marine Corps air assets to the base. Okinawans have voted overwhelmingly against this construction and the overall presence of U.S. Marines. **Stars and Stripes (3/29/19)**

Korean Peninsula

On 18 MAR, Republic of Korea Air Force personnel accidentally launched a surface-to-air (SAM) missile while conducting routine maintenance. Two mechanics accidentally left the firing sequence wiring active while conducting a test and launched the Cheongung medium-range SAM about 85 kilometers northeast of Seoul. The USD 1.33 million missile exploded in the air. **Yonhap News Agency (3/21/19)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
March 2019	24	25	26	27	28	1	2
	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	10	11	12 IND	13 THA	14	15	16
	17	18	19	20 IND	21 IND	22	23
	24 THA	25	26 BNG	27	28	29 PHL	30
April 2019	31	1	2	3	4	5	6
	7 IND	8	9	10	11 IND	12	13 THA
	14 THA	15 THA	16	17 INDO	18 IND	19	20
	21	22	23 IND	24	25	26	27
May 2019	28 THA	29 IND	30	1	2	3	4
	5 IND	6 IND	7	8	9	10	11
	12 IND	13	14	15	16	17	18
	19 IND	20	21	22	23 IND	24	25
	26	27	28 IND	29 NEP	30	31	1

BNG – Bangladesh
 IND – India
 INDO – Indonesia
 NEP – Nepal
 PHL – Philippines
 THA – Thailand
 WW – Worldwide

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate	PN – Partner Nation
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil	PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	QRF – Quick Response Force
CIV – Civilian	RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
COIN – Counter-insurgency	RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
CWIED – Command Wire IED	SA – South Asia
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency	SAF – Small Arms Fire
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile	SEA – Southeast Asia
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal	SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
F/C – Found & Cleared	TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
HME – Homemade Explosives	TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C ₇ H ₅ N ₃ O ₆)
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)	TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
IDF – Indirect Fire	UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
IED – Improvised Explosive Device	VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom	VOIED – Victim Operated IED
KIA – Killed in Action	WIA – Wounded in Action
LOC – Line of Communication	
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas	
MSR – Main Supply Routes	
NFI – No Further Information	
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report	
PBA – Post Blast Analysis	
PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED	
PCB – Printed Circuit Board	

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group	JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani	JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate	KIA – Kachin Independence Army
BSF – Border Security Forces	KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
BNP – Bangladesh National Party	KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)	LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)	MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines	MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)	NPA – New People's Army
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani	PNP – Philippine National Police
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	POLRI – Indonesian National Police
HNLC – Hynniewtre National Liberation Council (India)	PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh	RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau	RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
IM – Indian Mujahideen	SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
IrW – Irregular Warfare	SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)	ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham	UWSA – United Wa State Army
JAD – Jamaah Ansharut Daulah	YCL – Youth Communist League
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid	
JI – Jemaah Islamiya	
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	